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An overwhelming feeling among the participants was that the workshop was extraordinarily successful. This was determined by a number of factors, among which two significant ones were:

(a) An excellent group of participants.

As different from other workshops, the participants were new to international NGO activities. They were young and therefore less inhibited, more impressionable. They were thoroughly selected by the partners. Working with them has strategic importance for IA. Especially crucial was the role of Zaur Borov, our partner from Nalchik. Zaur is older than most other participants, and has the experience of participating in a conflict whilst being from a different background. He soon became the main engine for developing unusually warm and close relations between participants throughout the workshop, and gave a special boost to the peace process during the simulation. Zaur should be invested with skills and made the NGO Forum’s - or, indeed, IA’s representative in the North Caucasus.

(b) The amount of time and effort put in preparing the programme for the workshop.

The programme incorporated three important methodological elements:

• the combination of identity group exercises with individual exercises, which allowed to diffuse tension between the identity groups at the individual level, and to lift the trust which appeared first at the individual level to the identity group level
• simulation (role-play)

The simulation helped the young people to address the conflict directly whilst remaining in a more secure environment than reality usually presents. It empowered them and demonstrated that if they were in the position of key decision makers they could make peace without sacrificing their identity group interests. They learned the difficulties decision-makers experience and the importance of taking into account the interests of all players, since failure to take into consideration the interests of any party (especially one as big as Russia) results in the undermining of local peace efforts and potentially a large war. The simulation taught them not to leave anybody out, to understand who the real players are, and how their knowledge of players and their interests constrains the decision margins available.

• reflection and participatory process

Reflection and the participatory process played an important part in the course of the workshop. “What happened just now?” “What did I/you do?” “Why did I/you do it?” These were the questions the participants asked each other and themselves after almost every exercise and mini-event. They were given an opportunity to reflect upon every new stage in the development of the workshop, to put forward their ideas on how it should develop further and come back to previous events from a new perspective, constantly re-evaluating the flow of the workshop.

• We opened the workshop with a discussion about ways of learning (prescriptive versus elicitive approaches), and some theoretical discussions about communication, points of view and mapping the conflict. At this stage in the proceedings such discussions proved too theoretical for the participants. A part of the information was lost. Only towards the end of the workshop, having learned through action and exercises the difference between the prescriptive and elicitive approaches were they able to come back to Day One and re-evaluate the theory underlying what they had learned. In the light of this experience it may seem wise to include inputs on learning and communication basics later in the first third of the workshop, after participants have carried out some exercises, rather than so near the beginning.
• It cannot be assumed that the participants have learned the skills so deeply that they will use them without any difficulty in the future. Following the workshop they will suffer the reverse effect to that of its beginning - being immersed in their everyday condition again. Also, as one of them noted, he now understands the giraffe’s position (which became a symbol referring to all they had learned during the workshop), but he is not sure that he will be able to reach that position every time he feels it necessary. Therefore, further work should be directed towards rooting this ability, and relevant skills, in the participants more firmly.
• It cannot be expected that, independently of any amount of work and effort invested by us, the participants will generate and implement peace-related activities on their own. Even though the likelihood of that increases with a successful workshop, there is still a huge gap between good intentions and action. One can be certain, however, that the workshop definitely contributed to their personal and professional development. But to maximize their impact on their environment, work with them should be carried out on a continual basis. In the future this work would ideally take the form of an independent programme on young people in the Caucasus.

The most important result of this workshop is that it shows a definite shift by the Abkhaz side towards readiness to work with the Georgians specifically on their conflict, without invoking other Caucasian NGOs as an excuse not to discuss the problem of mutual relations. This is a definite advance in confidence-building between our two main partner constituencies. Such a level of trust should be preserved, deepened and expanded. This was the first workshop in the project where the conflict was addressed directly by the participants from a problem-solving perspective.

Determined not to allow an outbreak of war between ‘Georgia’ and ‘Abkhazia’, the players excluded any participation of ‘Russia’ (who offered mediation, good offices, monitoring, etc.) ‘Russia’ was slow to shake up, but at the very final moment of concluding peace between ‘Georgia’ and ‘Abkhazia’ it sent its troops into Georgia under the pretext of anti-terrorist activity - to prevent terrorists from occupying some nuclear facilities. The international community condemned Russia as an aggressor, NATO declared Red Alert. Thus, the world found itself suddenly on the verge of World War Three because ‘Georgia’ and ‘Abkhazia’, in peacefully settling their dispute, did not sufficiently take into account the interests of ‘Russia’.

Such was the external course of events during the role-play. The specificity of role-play is such that no one participant from the inside can understand and take into account all of what is happening (just as it is in real life), therefore the participants come out of it with their own, widely differing interpretations. Thus it so happened that those who concluded peace in the name of ‘Georgia’ and ‘Abkhazia’ felt happy despite the fact that ‘Russia’ occupied ‘Georgia’ (they pointed out that ‘Russia’ was wrong and unfair), whilst those who were in the two other groups ‘Russia’ and ‘OSCE’ were in a pessimistic mood. A long time and much reflection and analysis were necessary for all to achieve a more or less similar understanding of what had happened during the game.

Entry into the simulation was facilitated by the exercises of the previous two days, which had continually taught the participants to put themselves in the giraffe’s position or in another’s shoes. Thus at the time of the game all the groups were comprised of a fairly mixed pool of people. The effect of representing the interests of the other (say, Russia or Abkhazia for a Georgian) was likewise extremely educational.

Exit from the game-space was psychologically very difficult. Towards the end of the day the participants were exhausted and yet they wished to continue to play. Some special exercises (rather than brute interruption) could usefully be devised in order to facilitate exit from such a psychologically demanding state.

This was a time full of non-stop fun and adventures during and after working hours. These included arrests of the participants by the local police (once even I almost got arrested), playing friendly tricks with each other, etc. At least two full nights were spent playing mafia - a game full of craft and mental cunning centering around issues of trust and deceit and the uncovering of mafiosi amongst the players - before they kill off the honest guys! At least one love story started to take shape.

As a result of the workshop the participants learned the following main skills:

(a) to put themselves in a ‘giraffe’s position’ (and in each other’s shoes);

(b) to listen and hear ‘the other’, to paraphrase and summarize;

(c) to continually reflect upon their actions and positions;

(d) to start appreciating the relativity of each other’s and their own truths;

(e) to think strategically about the real actors and their interests in devising a peace agenda;

(f) to work together on common projects;

(g) to negotiate, find common solutions, agree to disagree;

(h) to seek the least violent and costly solution in every situation;

(i) the elicitive and participatory learning approaches - an alternative to the prescriptive approach they were acquainted with.

Participants also had the advantage of establishing good personal relations for the future, and re-evaluating their perception and understanding of their place in life.

Because of the heavy training workload (which was a necessary component and could not have been much decreased), the participants did not have the time or preparation necessary to develop full-scale projects and get to the nitty-gritty of the proposals. They did, however, start to work on them and are determined to finish them during the second workshop (in early December, financed by International Alert’s Rapid Response capacity). There will be three projects:

- on types of federal relations;

- on setting up a Caucasian communications centre/clearing house of information;

- on action plans to tackle the problems facing today’s youth (drugs, unemployment, etc.)

All three are important, relevant and do-able. They will be on the agenda of the forthcoming rapid response workshop.

1. To share experiences of the role of youth in conflict & conflict resolution

2. To analyse the nature of violent conflict

3. To develop conflict resolution skills relevant to the context the participants’ work in

4. To produce individual action plans to guide participants’ practice after the workshop

The workshop has been designed to offer an opportunity for participants to learn specific skills by working together on activities related to their own experience. In addition to these activities, specific inputs will be given on learning, communication, negotiation and strategic intervention.

Phil Champain - Training Manager at International Alert

Gevork Ter-Gabrielian - Eurasia Programme Manager at International Alert

Participants will arrive in time for an evening meal. This will be followed by an informal gathering during which participants will introduce themselves and deal with any administrative maters that may arise.

0900 Arrival

Session 1 Welcome

Administration details

Introductions

Aims of the workshop & Background to the project

Session 2 Getting started - motivations and expectations

This session will begin by looking at our individual reasons for attending this workshop.

LUNCH

Part B How we learn

Session 3 Ways of working

This session will draw attention to how people learn. It will outline the difference between elicitive and prescriptive approaches and familiarise participants with some of the methodologies that will be used during the workshop.

Study Groups will also be established. In these groups, participants will help each other in developing action plans which demonstrate how they will apply their learning after the workshop.

Some ground rules will be agreed to help the workshop succeed.

Session 4 Communication Skills I

This session will practice some of the personal communication skills necessary for effective learning - in particular listening, reframing and summarising.

1800 Close

0900 Brief recap of Day 1

Session 1 The Basic Problem - an activity

This session will begin the process of conflict analysis by using pictures as a stimulus to formulating ideas about conflict.

Session 2 Approaches to mapping conflict

Participants will be introduced to different ways of mapping conflicts including (I) Issue based (ii) People, problem, process (iii) Issues, needs & fears.

Mapping Conflict

Participants will divide into regional groups to map the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict..

LUNCH

Session 3 Presentations of Maps

Each group to present their map. Discussion to follow. Participants will be asked to think about what is happening during this activity and to identify the skills that are being used.

Communication Skills II

This session will extend the practice of personal communication skills, connecting them with the conflict mapping activity

Revisiting the maps

Participants will revisit their maps with more knowledge of the perspective of the other group. They will be encouraged to work towards a common understanding of the conflict by using their communication skills more consciously.

Session 4 Debriefing - Plenary

The amended maps will be discussed to assess the extent to which the participants have moved their positions. Participants will reflect on what they have learnt through the exercise.

Study Groups

Participants will work in their study groups to reflect upon what they have learnt so far and to begin to formulate action plans.

1800 Close

0900 Brief recap

Agenda for the day

Session 1 The different stages of conflict - a simulation.

This simulation will involve participants forming groups representative of different parties to the conflict. In roles, they will decide what interventions to make and will observe the effects of their interventions on the other groups in the context of the conflict.

Session 2 Preparing for negotiations

Once the simulation has reached the negotiation phase participants will be asked to generate options for a settlement using ‘decision trees’. Each group will work out a proposal to take to the negotiation table.

LUNCH

Session 3 Negotiations

The groups will come to the negotiating table with their proposals. There will be several negotiating tables, each with representatives from each side of the conflict, plus observers and third parties.

Presentation of Solutions

Each table will present their solution/settlement. There will be discussion about the similarities and differences.

Session 4 Debriefing

Participants will reflect on the day. The lessons they have learnt about the cycle of conflict, negotiation and communication. They may also use this opportunity to identify areas for further work.

Study Groups

Continue to prepare action plans

1800 Close

Purpose: To present action plans developed in study groups over the past few days, for comment and constructive criticism.

0900 Feedback on day 4 and recap of the first three days.

Session 1 Study Groups

Participants spend time finalising their action plans and presentations that they have been working on since the start of the workshop.

Session 2 Presentations

LUNCH

Session 3 Presentations contd...

Session 4 Evaluation

In plenary and in study groups

1800 End

- division in 4 (or 5) groups

- general sessions

- every opinion outside the speaker’s presentation is expressed by raising hand and asking the simulation leader’s permission, and only if the leader permits (the leader may not permit only if there is no time left for that particular round)

- group work

- groups can be changed and slightly modified during the game; groups can have independent official or clandestine communication with each other during the group work; groups can’t sacrifice the interests of the actor they represent

- groups select speakers to present the group opinion at the general session; speakers rotate from session to session; they do not express their personal opinion--only group opinion; if there is a dissenting opinion, the dissenter has a right to express it within the time for presentation given to each group (usually ten minutes); in that case, it is the group’s responsibility to accommodate dissenter’s opinion and to leave him/her a time for presenting it; if the group fails to do that, the dissenter should ask the simulation leader to be given time at the discussion period

- principles of game:

- rules of communication

- danger of emotional involvement: be careful not to hurt feelings of other participants

- time-table: deadlines as strict as possible

- interests of group actors: (see attachment)

- the simulation works because the interests of actors clash, and that way people learn how it happens in the international setting, where there is no higher authority to make the decision

- speaker presents the group opinion

- further steps according to the scenario limit the options

- actors:

- specifically: a strong state; a weak state; an ethnic group; and an international organization

- their interests: maximize independence and power within the limits of their capabilities

- why does an ethnic group revolt:

- oppression

- provocation by the strong neighbor

- weakness of the central authorities

- perceptual conflict: misinterpretation of actions of others

- internal political reasons (nationalist leaders want to maximize power)

(In what way it declares independence)

Options: referendum; leader’s declaration; attack of Georgia; Request by the Parliament to be united with Russia; other

(reaction to Abkhazia’s declaration)

Options: declaration by the President/ Parliament; sending in troops; arresting the leaders; applying to the international community; suggesting direct negotiations; other

(reaction to Abkhazia’s and Georgia’s moves)

Options: offer impartial mediation; taking sides with one of the actors; sending in troops; humanitarian help; other

(reaction to the moves of the first three actors)

Options: offer of mediation; condemning one or more of the actors; requesting mandate for peace-keeping from UN; requesting troops from NATO; requesting troops from member-states; other

(what it does to strengthen independence)

Options: attack Georgia; apply to international community to supervise its referendum for self-determination; apply to Russia; accuse Georgia in gross human rights violations, or using chemical weapons against the civilian population; ethnic cleansing of Georgians from its territory; other

(what it does to restore its rule)

Options: attack Abkhazia; ethnic cleansing of Abkhazians from its territory; accept Abkhazia’s proposal of referendum (or any other); accept mediation by Russia and / or OSCE; invite mercenaries; offer federative solution; offer direct negotiations; offer huge financial supply if Abkhazia backs up; other

(what it does to escalate or placate violence)

Options: intervene militarily; blockade economically; remain neutral; help one of the sides;

cooperate with the OSCE; conflict with the OSCE; other

(what it does to placate violence and resolve the conflict)

Options: react to the news about atrocities; send fact-finding missions; organize a group of military observers; propose cease-fire; offer good offices; not to do anything and go to work in Bosnia; other

(why does it agree to cease-fire)

Options: exhausted; achieved its aims; leadership change; promised something by Russia; leadership change in Georgia; Georgia offers irresistible solution; other

(why does it agree to cease-fire)

Options: exhausted; coup-d’etat occurred; wants time to prepare for new attack; believes that negotiations will be in favor of its position; pressured by Russia or OSCE; other

(why does it agree to broker or facilitate cease-fire)

Options: it will restore its military in Georgia; needs stability to lay the pipe-line through Georgia; is pressured by the peace party inside; its role in the conflict increases dramatically; is afraid that the conflict will spill over its borders, and awaken its own Muslim minorities; other

(what can it do to broker or facilitate the cease-fire)

Options: limit Russia’s role; help Georgia to restore its integrity; help Abkhazia to avoid genocide and ethnic cleansing; sharply criticize Russia for intervention in the conflict; other

(what is its position at negotiations)

Options: complete independence; in principle agree to federation; wants to have economic independence; wants to have military; wants to have independent foreign affairs; other

(what is its position at negotiations)

Options: agree only to unitary state (negotiations fail); agree to federation; offers other creative solutions; is generous; is intransigent; other

(what is its position at negotiations)

Options: offers Abkhazia to be united with itself; supports one of the sides; offers economic and financial assistance; suggests creative and non-trivial solutions (federation; confederation; territory-without-status; international guarantees; postponement of status; other)

(what is its position at negotiations)

Options: adopts / rejects Abkhazia as a side in conflict and negotiations; offers financial and economic assistance; offers observers and peace-keepers; offers creative solutions (see Russia’s options); other

In this round, groups can also express their utopian visions of the peaceful world

(what is its vision of post-conflict settlement)

Options: fundamental islamist; democratic; autocratic; free market; social democrat; law-abiding; anarchic; normal relations with Georgia; no relations; etc.

(what is its vision of post-conflict life)

Options: try again to oppress Abkhazia; construct a pipe-line; destroy a pipe-line; give up Abkhazia and concentrate on democracy-building at home; erupt in civil war; other

(what is its position toward post-conflict Caucasus)

Options: help to reconstruct; pressurize to restore its military power; provoke new conflicts; work on conflict prevention; help build democracy; support autocratic leaders; other

(what is its post-conflict conflict management policy)

Options: elections organization and observation in Georgia and Abkhazia; human rights reports; resettlement of refugees; request international financial institutions to cut off developmental aid if human rights standards are violated; deepening conflict with Russia over influence in the region; other

General discussion, questions-answers session, recapitulation, exchange of opinions about the worth of the simulation.

Wants either complete independence, or unification with Russia, or confederation with Georgia; population is small, but well-organized, and ready to fight guerrilla war forever; greatly counts on support by weapons, economic deliveries, military advice from Russia, and volunteers from other Muslim ethnic groups.

Wants to preserve the integrity of the state by any means; if loses in the short-run, will try to achieve a kind of solution which will allow it, as a stronger side in conflict, to restore its complete sovereignty over Abkhazia over time, perhaps by economic and other measures.

Wants to use the conflict for its own benefit: to reinstall its military bases in Georgia; to bring Georgia back to its sphere of political influence; to preserve Abkhazia as a lever to be always used against Georgia, if it tries to minimize Russia’s influence; but not to give complete independence to Abkhazia, so that it would not be a precedent.

A complex organization of 56 states designed to scan compliance with democratic, human rights, and other norms of the eastern member-states; lacks money and troops for real peace-keeping; but in convenient circumstances, may ask other actors and receive financial support and troops to implement a peace settlement. Is slow and inefficient in decision-making, and diplomats-state representatives in OSCE are often not motivated to undertake drastic measures to prevent or resolve conflicts; but some institutions of OSCE (as High Commissioner for National Minorities) are/have highly motivated and internationally renowned personalities.